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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, legal scholars have debated whether the law 
and the United States legal system are becoming more complex.1
One common theme throughout this body of research is the general 
argument and conclusion that complexity is indeed growing. In fact, 
Schuck even argues that the growth thesis is fairly uncontroversial.2
But what is generally meant by this growing complexity? To start, 
we adopt Posner’s framework, which argues that there are two 
related types of complexity.3 The first is external complexity, which 
is defined as complexity due to the external environment.4 The 
external environment is composed of such systems from the 
economic, political, ecological, or technological arenas and the 
interactions within and between them.5 By almost all accounts, the 
external world is becoming more complex, and this, according to 
Posner, makes the job of judging more difficult, especially because 
judges have no control or influence over the external environment.6  
In contrast, as Posner argues, internal complexity is brought on 
by judges’ attempts to manage and cope with the rising levels of 
external complexity, usually by employing a complex style of legal 
analysis to resolve cases without having to understand factual 
complexities.7 The important intersection between internal and 
external complexity suggests that judges may either “complexify” 
the law and legal process needlessly, or they may try to simplify the 
law at the expense of the complex external world.8 Hence, increasing 
internal complexity only adds to the difficulties that judges face in 
carrying out the duties of their job. 
                                                     
1. See generally Michael J. Bommarito II & Daniel M. Katz, A
Mathematical Approach to the Study of the United States Code, 389 PHYSICA A 
4195 (2010); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING (2013); Peter 
H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 1 (1992). 
2. Schuck, supra note 1, at 6. 
3. POSNER, supra note 1, at 3-4.
4. Id. at 4. 
5. Id. at 3-4.
6. Id.  
7. Id. at 4. 
8. Id.  
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Thus far, claims of growing complexity have received 
relatively little challenge. As a result, it seems implicitly assumed 
that judges would develop expertise through experience that would 
enable them to cope with this growing complexity. But why should 
we care about growing complexity and whether judges develop 
expertise to cope with it? To start, the implications are enormous. 
Generally speaking, there are potentially severe negative 
consequences for our law and legal system that stem from growing 
complexity. Specifically, growing complexity and a lack of expertise 
may have unhealthy effects on U.S. democracy if they hinder the 
ability of judges to render just and fair decisions; if they result in 
barriers for litigants to gain access to the legal system; and, more 
generally, if they impede our society’s system of governance that 
was designed to equitably and efficiently resolve disputes. In short, 
the growing complexity of our legal system and a lack of judicial 
expertise present an important concern.  
More specific to our purposes here, for those who acknowledge 
that the legitimacy of a legal system is necessary for a thriving and 
healthy democracy, how judges cope with this growing complexity 
becomes vitally important. Interestingly, however, what is generally 
missing from this discussion on complexity is a systematic 
examination of how judges have dealt with the growing complexity 
of the legal system. Hence, the broader question we address is, how 
have United States Supreme Court Justices’ expertise fared despite 
this growing complexity? This question is necessary for two different 
yet related reasons. 
First, as the external environment changes and becomes more 
complex, a person’s expertise can change even if the person does not 
change their approach. Stated differently, a person’s expertise may 
actually decline if their method of coping with the increased 
complexity is not sufficient. Second, and by implication, in order for 
an individual to increase or develop his or her expertise in an 
environment that is becoming more complex, an individual must 
adapt. This essentially means that judicial expertise needs to account 
for how individuals (judges mainly) themselves grapple with a 
changing external world. This often comes in the form of a struggle 
to incorporate increased amounts of information and knowledge into 
legal decision-making and opinion-writing.  
We argue that a dynamic understanding of expertise is possible 
when we conceptualize expertise in a way that is consistent with 
research from psychology on domain expertise. Specifically, 
expertise is a function of two things. First, expertise consists of how 
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much knowledge one possesses and displays in domain relevant 
tasks and decisions.9 Second, experts and novices differ in how 
knowledge is structured and stored or “chunked.”10 Thus, if we are to 
understand the importance of judicial expertise and how it operates 
within an environment of growing complexity to influence the law 
and our legal system, we first need to measure the Justices’ expertise 
in a dynamic manner. By first developing a new measure of judicial 
expertise, we can address whether the Justices’ expertise has 
increased or decreased during this changing external environment.  
To first develop a new measure of expertise, we examine the 
written majority opinions from twenty-seven Supreme Court Justices
who all served at least ten terms over the last century. Examining 
their written opinions from two issue areas—criminal procedure and 
economic activity—we adopt a “text as data” approach and treat 
each written opinion as a particular type of complex network—
namely, a co-occurrence network—where each word in the text 
represents a node, and nodes are connected by a link if their 
corresponding words occur next to each other (reading left to right) 
in text. Representing opinions as networks allows us to analyze the 
topological features of the obtained representation and extract a set 
of informative network measurements that are indicative of the 
author’s expertise on the two established dimensions. 
We use these indicators to develop estimates of judicial 
expertise corresponding to each year. Using this new, dynamic 
measure, we provide a descriptive account of how Supreme Court 
Justices’ expertise has evolved over time in their attempts to grapple 
with a changing information environment that is becoming more 
complex. We find that some Justices increase their expertise over 
time, even in the face of growing complexity of the external 
environment. However, we also find that some Justices’ expertise 
has not kept pace and has, in some cases, declined. This suggests to 
                                                     
9. E.g., K. Anders Ericsson, Ralf Th. Krampe & Clemens Tesch-Römer, 
The Role of Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance, 100 
PSYCHOL. REV. 363, 365 (1993); Ronald T. Kellogg, Professional Writing Expertise,
in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE 389, 389 
(K. Anders Ericsson et al. eds., 2006). 
10. E.g., Dennis E. Egan & Barry J. Schwartz, Chunking in Recall of 
Symbolic Drawings, 7 MEMORY & COGNITION 149, 149 (1979); K. Anders Ericsson, 
William G. Chase & Steve Faloon, Acquisition of a Memory Skill, 208 SCIENCE
1181, 1181 (1980); K. Anders Ericsson & Peter G. Polson, An Experimental 
Analysis of the Mechanisms of a Memory Skill, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 305, 305-06 (1988); William G. Chase & 
Herbert A. Simon, Perception in Chess, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 55, 55-56 (1973). 
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us that expertise is not simply a function of experience. Rather, the 
acquisition of legal expertise is complicated because of the rapidly 
changing external environment and how Justices have chosen to cope 
with it. 
This paper makes several contributions. First, this is the first 
paper to develop a measure of expertise of the Justices that is based 
on the content of their work product—their written opinions. Second, 
it is the first work to use networks derived from text to differentiate 
between novices and experts in multiple issue areas. Third, we show 
that legal expertise is structured by two factors—the amount of 
knowledge of the expert and how that knowledge is structured—and 
that these two factors are consistent across two issue areas. Fourth, 
this paper illustrates the dynamic nature of expertise in an unstable 
domain—with Justices showing both increased and decreased 
expertise. This provides a more nuanced understanding of how 
expertise can evolve in the face of an increasingly complex 
environment. In our conclusion, we highlight future directions for 
research in the area of expertise. 
The rest of this Article proceeds in the following fashion. In the 
next section, we add more detail to our understanding of Posner’s 
two types of complexity and its connection to expertise. From there, 
we discuss how previous research has typically conceptualized 
expertise, drawing on research in the fields of political science and 
then psychology. Following that, we outline our methodological 
approach to generating a new, dynamic measure that incorporates 
network indicators derived from texts of Supreme Court opinions. 
We then examine trends of the Justices’ expertise over time, and also 
whether greater expertise correlates with a decrease in the number of 
concurring opinions. We conclude with a brief discussion of future 
directions for our research as well as some implications of our work.  
I. GROWING COMPLEXITY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Research on the Supreme Court illustrates examples of both 
types of Posner’s complexity. For example, the growth over time of 
amicus curiae (friend of the Court) brief submissions illustrates the 
growing complexity of the external environment. Amicus briefs are 
often thought of as sources of extra information for the Justices about 
the case that might not be included in the parties’ briefs, yet could be 
vitally relevant to the case. Collins examines both the total number 
of briefs submitted each term, as well as the total number of 
participating outside parties each term, and shows how they have 
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changed over time.11 Specifically, Collins finds that both of them 
increase sharply over time.12 If increased amicus participation is 
taken as a sign of the complexity of a case, which seems like a fair 
assumption given that amicus briefs often add much nuance and 
varied perspectives to a case, then the amount of information being 
communicated to the Court has increased substantially and suggests 
that we have a more complex external legal environment compared 
to earlier years. In other words, the external environment brings 
cases to the doorstep of the Supreme Court that are now more 
complex than past cases. This only further bolsters the need to know 
whether Justices are developing the expertise needed to keep pace. 
Turning to an example of internal complexity, scholars have 
highlighted the growing length of Supreme Court opinions. In 
attempting to communicate with their audiences, Justices have the 
choice of how much or little they want to write when drafting 
opinions. Black and Spriggs graphically display the median length of 
Supreme Court opinions over time, as well as the inter-quartile range 
over time.13 Their analysis reveals an obviously upward trend over 
time.14 In short, Supreme Court opinions are becoming dramatically 
longer (e.g., the median opinion length in 2000 had approximately 
4,500 words while from the 1940s to the 1970s it was approximately 
2,000 words).15 If we assume that longer is generally equivalent to 
being more complicated, it suggests the possibility that judges are 
coping with the growing external complexity by writing longer 
opinions.16 These increasingly lengthy opinions led to Posner’s 
advice that judges need to write shorter opinions.17 To demonstrate 
this, in the appendix of Chapter 8, he goes to great lengths to 
                                                     
11. See Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence 
of Amicus Curiae Participation in the U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 807, 810-11 (2004).
12. Id.  
13. Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the 
Length of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 635 (2008).  
14. Id.
15. Id.  
16. We argue that most people will likely think this a safe assumption. We 
note, however, that growing the length of an opinion might also be construed, in 
some contexts, as a Justice’s attempts at greater specificity and precision (i.e., being 
more thorough). That greater length may be an attempt to carefully, in detailed 
fashion, sort through the complicated details and articulate the many nuances of a 
case.  
17. POSNER, supra note 1, at 236, 255-58, 276-86.
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demonstrate this point by rewriting a 3,237 word appellate court 
decision (that is not his) to a 602 word opinion.18
What is unclear, however, despite Posner’s prescription, is 
under what circumstances will shorter opinions indicate more 
expertise? Perhaps the most challenging aspect to his advice is that 
Justices will have to omit domain relevant knowledge to write 
shorter opinions, and that may be problematic because it can leave 
counterarguments unaddressed. Perhaps the key is whether adding 
length to an opinion is adding new or redundant knowledge, which is 
something we will return to later. Regardless, to better understand 
why we need a new, dynamic measure of judicial expertise, in the 
next section we review current literature on how political scientists 
have measured judicial expertise and illustrate how none of those 
approaches can accommodate a changing information environment.  
II. EXPERTISE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Previous attempts to quantitatively measure expertise usually 
equate experience with expertise. Specifically, prior research has 
looked at expertise under three different umbrellas. The first 
approach has looked for what is known as “the freshman” effect, 
where a Justice has an acclimation period, usually lasting through the 
first or second term on the Court, where they are orienting 
themselves to their new job, role, and judicial philosophy.19 This 
usually entails, among other things, simultaneously developing the 
skills of judging, bargaining, and negotiation with their colleagues; 
adjusting to their new environment; and crafting written opinions on 
a collegial court. In addition, Wood, Keith, Lanier, and Ogundele 
found significant differences for both the time period and if they 
were previously a lower court judge.20 In particular, modern era 
judges experienced stronger acclimation effects than those from an 
earlier era (1888-1940), and those that lacked lower court judge 
experience were susceptible to greater acclimation effects (e.g., 
voting instability).21 In contrast, Scheb and Ailshie find that Justice 
O’Connor did not exhibit behavior that was consistent with the 
                                                     
18. Id. at 276-86.  
19. See generally Timothy M. Hagle, “Freshmen Effects” for Supreme 
Court Justices, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1142 (1993). 
20. Sandra L. Wood et al., “Acclimation Effects” for Supreme Court 
Justices: A Cross-Validation, 1888-1940, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 690-94 (1998).  
21. Id.  
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“freshman effect” label,22 and Rubin and Melone reached a similar 
conclusion about Justice Scalia,23 as well as Justice Kennedy.24
This approach has some empirical validity and is highly 
intuitive, but we note that it also more or less assumes that Justices
make the shift from novice to expert after only a short amount of 
time with no consideration for how the external environment has 
changed and little systematic attention to the outputs of judging—
opinions. Furthermore, after accounting for a number of 
complicating factors that resulted in previous studies reporting mixed 
results, Hagle finds that some Justices experience freshman effects 
while others do not.25 This further suggests the need to find an 
alternative approach for the measure of legal expertise.  
The second approach has taken a more empirically grounded 
approach in measuring the development of issue expertise. 
Specifically, it looks at the number of opinions authored in a given 
issue area, with the assumption that as one begins to author a 
substantial number of opinions in a given issue area then expertise 
begins to follow. Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck use this measure 
and find that opinion-writing assignments are influenced by it.26
Black, Johnson, and Wedeking use this measure to show that issue 
experts are more likely to interrupt their colleagues at oral argument, 
as well as the fact that Justices Blackmun and Powell were more 
likely to take notes at oral arguments when a Justice with more 
expertise spoke.27 While this measure has a number of desirable 
properties (e.g., it is dynamic in that it changes over time and it 
varies across issue areas), we note that it is also limited because it 
says nothing about the quality of the opinions or the actual content 
contained in the opinions. 
The third approach incorporates factors from a Justice’s social 
background. Specifically, it is theorized that Justices with certain 
previous work or life experiences may provide them with tendencies 
                                                     
22. John M. Scheb II & Lee W. Ailshie, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and 
the “Freshman Effect,” 69 JUDICATURE 9, 9-12 (1985).  
23. Thea F. Rubin & Albert P. Melone, Justice Antonin Scalia: A First Year 
Freshman Effect?, 72 JUDICATURE 98, 98-102 (1988).  
24. Albert P. Melone, Revisiting the Freshman Effect Hypothesis: The First 
Two Terms of Justice Anthony Kennedy, 74 JUDICATURE 6, 6-13 (1990).  
25. Hagle, supra note 19, at 1147-53. 
26. FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK,
CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 38 (2000).
27. RYAN C. BLACK, TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON & JUSTIN WEDEKING, ORAL 
ARGUMENTS AND COALITION FORMATION ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A
DELIBERATE DIALOGUE 14-15 (2012).  
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to decide cases a certain way (e.g., former prosecutors tend to make 
more conservative decisions). A commonly cited example is Justice 
Harry Blackmun’s authorship of the landmark abortion case Roe v. 
Wade.28 Greenhouse argues that Blackmun drew upon his experience 
as a lawyer for the Mayo Clinic to help him draft the majority 
opinion, which is known for conceptualizing the case through the 
eyes of doctors, and not through the eyes of women’s rights per se. 
While these factors are important, we note that social background 
factors are unlikely to be a dynamic factor in developing expertise 
that is able to capture the changes during the course of a Justice’s 
tenure on the Court.  
Assessing these three approaches together, we think a common 
strand that runs through all of them is the fact that they equate 
experience with expertise. While equating experience with expertise 
may work as a rough proxy, we think expertise is more than simply 
acquiring plain “experience” with the passage of time. Expertise is 
the ability to show mastery of a domain that novices do not possess, 
and that this mastery should provide benefits in the form of more 
skilled opinions and better legal policy. Moreover, in an environment 
that is rapidly changing, expertise needs to be dynamic. As a result, 
we think the literature is lacking a robust and dynamic measure of 
expertise. To search for alternative approaches, we shift to research 
in psychology and its long lineage of examining domain expertise.  
III. EXPERTISE IN PSYCHOLOGY
Simon and Chase’s foundational theory is perhaps the most 
important and robust theory on expertise.29 It argues that the 
differentiation between experts and novices depends upon the 
amount of knowledge one possesses and the way that knowledge is 
organized.30 Simon and Chase showed that chess masters had vastly 
superior recall compared to novices when they were briefly 
presented regular game positions.31 It was theorized that the masters 
had acquired large amounts of knowledge of chess positions and, 
unlike novices, had organized or “chunked” the positions of 
individual pieces as single, meaningful configurations.32 It was this 
                                                     
28. See 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
29. Chase & Simon, supra note 10, at 55-81. 
30. Id. at 80-81.
31. Id. at 77. 
32. Id. at 80.  
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organization that gives experts, but not novices, the ability to recall 
chess configurations as meaningful.33
Despite this important finding, many researchers instead 
focused on a different aspect of the Simon and Chase study. In 
addition to their finding that experts appear to chunk domain 
knowledge, Simon and Chase reported that chess champions had at 
least ten years of domain related experience before winning 
international tournaments.34 This finding garnered much attention 
and became somewhat of a gold standard (along with reputation 
among peers and amount of education) by which to identify an 
expert.35 However, the belief that a sufficient amount (e.g., ten years) 
of experience or practice leads to expertise drew criticism by 
scholars who showed only a weak to moderate relationship between 
performance level and the amount of practice and experience.36 With 
evidence that experience does not necessarily mean superior 
performance or skill within a domain, scientists returned to consider 
the relationship between knowledge, structure, and expertise.37
Studies looking at the structural component of expertise had 
more luck in linking the structure of knowledge to superior skill in a 
number of areas.38 More specifically, research established unique 
differences in the way that experts and novices organize knowledge. 
For example, expert knowledge representations of domain related 
information are superior and well defined compared to those of 
novices.39 In particular, experts center their knowledge 
                                                     
33. Id. at 80-81.  
34. Id. at 56. 
35. Michael I. Posner, Introduction to MICHELENE T.H. CHI, ROBERT 
GLASER & MARSHALL J. FARR, THE NATURE OF EXPERTISE, at xxix, xxxi-xxxii 
(1988). See generally THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EXPERTISE: COGNITIVE RESEARCH AND 
EMPIRICAL AI (Robert R. Hoffman ed., 1992). 
36. See Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Römer, supra note 9, at 366. 
37. To further elaborate, ten years of domain related experience may not 
make one an expert, but most research indicates that at least ten years of practice or 
experience is necessary for expertise. In other words, ten years of experience is 
necessary, but not sufficient, in the acquisition of expertise. See id. at 365-68.  
38. See, e.g., Janice D. Gobert, Expertise in the Comprehension of 
Architectural Plans: Knowledge Acquisition and Inference-Making, in VISUAL &
SPATIAL REASONING DESIGN 184, 200-05 (John S. Gero & B. Tversky eds., 1999); 
Egan & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 152-58; Ericsson & Polson, supra note 10;
Katherine B. McKeithen et al., Knowledge Organization and Skill Differences in 
Computer Programmers, 13 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 307, 307-09 (1981).  
39. See, e.g., Bat-Sheva Eylon & F. Reif, Effects of Knowledge 
Organization on Task Performance, 1 COGNITION & INSTRUCTION 5, 8, 10 (1984); Jill 
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representations on deep relationships between key domain concepts, 
while novices are centered on superficial connections between non-
essential domain concepts.40 In addition, network models of 
knowledge show that novices tend to link domain information in a 
more random manner compared to experts.41  
To elaborate further, in a study of expertise in problem solving, 
Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser found that experts categorize problems 
according to “deep” features while novices categorize problems 
using “surface” features.42 They asked experts and novices to sort 
physics word problems based on their similarity.43 Experts sorted 
them according to underlying physics principles (e.g., Newton’s 
Second Law) while novices sorted them on the basis of the surface 
similarity of the problem statement (e.g., both problems involved an 
inclined plane).44 Furthermore, experts used their well-organized 
internal library of previously experienced physics problems to match 
the current problem with a problem solving strategy.45 Novices, 
lacking such organized, extensive representations, attempted to 
construct solutions from the information given in the problem 
statement.46
A network study by Schvaneveldt et al. showed that the 
knowledge network representations of aviation concepts were most 
similar among expert pilots.47 Specifically, expert pilots’ networks 
contained only the most pertinent domain concepts, and only the 
                                                                                                               
H. Larkin, Processing Information for Effective Problem Solving, 70 ENGINEERING 
EDUC., 285, 285-88 (1979). 
40. See Michelene T.H. Chi, Paul J. Feltovich & Robert Glaser, 
Categorization and Representation of Physics Problems by Experts and Novices,
5 COGNITIVE SCI. 121, 121-23 (1981).  
41. See, e.g., Kurt Kraiger, Eduardo Salas & Janis A. Cannon-Bowers, 
Measuring Knowledge Organization as a Method for Assessing Learning During 
Training, 37 HUM. FACTORS 814, 810-11 (1995); William C. McGaghie et al., 
Quantitative Concept Mapping in Pulmonary Physiology: Comparison of Student 
and Faculty Knowledge Structures, 23 ADVANCES PHYSIOLOGY EDUC. 72, 75 (2000); 
Renée J. Stout, Eduardo Salas & Kurt Kraiger, The Role of Trainee Knowledge 
Structures in Aviation Team Environments, 7 INT’L J. AVIATION PSYCHOL. 235, 238-
39 (1997). 
42. See Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, supra note 40, at 124-25.  
43. Id. at 130-31.  
44. Id. at 132-33.  
45. Id. at 132.  
46. Id.  
47. See Roger W. Schvaneveldt et al., Measuring the Structure of Expertise,
23 INT. J. MAN-MACHINE STUD. 699, 715 (1985). 
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most salient associations between concepts were linked.48 Novice 
pilots’ networks, however, varied from one another, contained non-
critical domain concepts, and included seemingly random links 
between concepts.49 Furthermore, the average novice network 
contained sixty-five links compared to the average expert network 
that contained thirty-nine links, indicating that novices were making 
extraneous connections between concepts that experts were not.50
The knowledge networks of experts, in contrast, were sparser, 
representing only the most relevant domain associations.51
Though network studies are useful in identifying structural 
differences between experts and novices, typical methods of network 
construction require experimental conditions that are not amenable to 
studies of elites or others where questionnaire administration is not 
feasible. Fortunately, there are ways to derive networks from 
archival data that can help us characterize properties of experts. In 
particular, the relatively young field of linguistic complex networks 
is dedicated to the extraction of networks from textual data.52 This 
field has recently seen an abundance of success in using text based 
networks to investigate issues in natural language processing, 
including the identification of literary movements,53 text 
summarization,54 and the quality of machine translation.55 While 
relatively little research has examined the properties of networks 
derived from text to study expertise, there are two studies in the 
linguistic complex networks literature that are directly relevant, in 
that they correlate complex network properties to text quality. In a 
study by Antiqueira, complex networks were derived from the text of 
                                                     
48. See id. at 711-13. 
49. See id.  
50. Id.  
51. See id. More recently, however, Schuelke et al. found that the number 
of network links was not meaningfully correlated with level of performance skill. 
See Matthew J. Schuelke et al., Relating Indices of Knowledge Structure Coherence 
and Accuracy to Skill-Based Performance: Is There Utility in Using a Combination 
of Indices?, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1076, 1082 (2009). 
52. E.g., Jin Cong & Haitao Liu, Approaching Human Language with 
Complex Networks, 11 PHYSICS LIFE REVS. 598, 599 (2014).  
53. See Diego Raphael Amancio, Osvaldo N. Oliveira Jr. & Luciano da 
Fontoura Costa, Identification of Literary Movements Using Complex Networks to 
Represent Texts, NEW J. PHYSICS Apr. 2012, at 1, 2. 
54. See Diego R. Amancio et al., Complex Networks Analysis of Language 
Complexity, EUROPHYSICS LETTERS, Dec. 2012, at 1, 1; Lucas Antiqueira et al., A
Complex Network Approach to Text Summarization, 179 INFO. SCI. 584, 585 (2009). 
55. See D.R. Amancio et al., Using Metrics from Complex Networks to 
Evaluate Machine Translation, 390 PHYSICA A 131, 137 (2011).  
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forty high school student essays written on the same topic.56 In 
addition, five human judges independently scored the essays on the 
basis of text quality.57 Antiqueira found that both average node 
strength and average clustering coefficient correlated negatively with 
text quality.58 In a similar study, Ke derived complex networks using 
a set of 500 short-answer responses from a Chinese achievement 
exam.59 The essays were additionally scored for quality by human 
raters.60 Like Antiqueira, Ke found that average clustering coefficient 
and average node strength decrease with increasing text quality, and 
additionally found that the number of network nodes decreases with 
increasing text quality.61 Findings from these two studies provide 
some insight into what network indicators will be helpful in 
identifying latent factors of judicial expertise.  
A common theme of early studies of domain expertise is that 
the domain space is stable (e.g., the domain of chess expertise does 
not change because the rules are fixed). In cases where this holds, 
traditional measures of expertise may be suitable. However, many 
domains are not stable and require a different approach to the study 
of expertise. In fact, Johansson argues that many “principles” of 
what defines an expert go “out the window” in ever-changing, less 
stable domains.62 A recent study by Macnamara et al. supports the 
idea that the study of expertise may be domain dependent.63 In a 
meta-analysis of eighty-eight studies on deliberate-practice, 
Macnamara and colleagues found that practice accounted for only 
12% of the difference in performance in a number of domains.64 This 
means that some of the defining principles of expertise (i.e.,
Ericsson’s 1993 theory of deliberate practice) are not applicable or 
are not as critical across domains.65 This suggests that network 
                                                     
56. L. Antiqueira et al., Strong Correlations Between Text Quality and 
Complex Networks Features, 373 PHYSICA A 811, 812 (2007). 
57. Id.
58. Id. at 817.  
59. Xiaohua Ke et al., Complex Dynamics of Text Analysis, 415 PHYSICA A 
307, 308 (2014).  
60. Id.  
61. See id. at 312.  
62. See FRANS JOHANSSON, THE CLICK MOMENT: SEIZING OPPORTUNITY IN 
AN UNPREDICTABLE WORLD 22-32 (2012). 
63. Brooke N. Macnamara, David Z. Hambrick & Frederick L. Oswald, 
Deliberate Practice and Performance in Music, Games, Sports, Education, and
Professions: A Meta-Analysis, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1608, 1615 (2014). 
64. Id. at 1610, 1612. 
65. Id. at 1615.  
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structure alone may not be enough to characterize expertise in a 
dynamic domain. To make sure we account for the major 
components of expertise in the legal domain, it is necessary to 
consider how Justices adapt to the changing environment, so we need 
to evaluate how network structure changes over time. In addition, we 
also need to include a component to measure the amount of 
information a Justice displays, in order to account for the information 
asymmetry between experts and novices. 
The work cited above suggests it is possible to distinguish 
between experts and novices based on network properties. 
Furthermore, this approach offers advantages over traditional 
measures of expertise in that it is applicable to a broad range of 
subjects, assuming there is corresponding textual data (e.g., 
speeches, opinions, and communications). What is needed now is an 
approach that takes our network approach to the study of expertise 
and adds a component that accounts for the information advantage 
that experts have over novices. 
IV. A NEW MEASURE OF EXPERTISE
Measuring judicial expertise presents several challenges. First, 
the measure must be dynamic in that it accounts for the changing 
environment and also any changes in how a Justice adapts (e.g., 
writing shorter or longer opinions). Second, a new measure must be 
able to be applied to elites and those that are unwilling to answer 
questionnaires. Third, to understand how expertise has functioned in 
other time periods, it must be applicable to other eras, even when the 
subjects of interest are dead. To meet these challenges, we apply 
networks to textual data. Specifically, we derive co-occurrence 
networks from Supreme Court opinions, and use features of these 
networks to characterize legal expertise. We do this because of 
previous research showing that parameters of linguistic networks are 
potential indicators of differences in content and style of text.66
Our first step in constructing co-occurrence networks from 
Supreme Court opinions involves pre-processing the text. More 
specifically, we remove stop words, which are words that have little 
semantic value.67 Next, the remaining words are modeled as nodes, 
                                                     
66. See generally Jin Cong & Haitao Liu, Approaching Human Language 
with Complex Networks, 11 PHYSICS LIFE REVS. 598 (2014).  
67. Most of the words considered stop words are articles and prepositions 
(e.g., the, it, or, of) and are removed because they function in the text namely to 
connect other content words. 
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and nodes are connected with a directed, weighted link if they occur 
in a window of two words within the text (e.g., they are adjacent in 
the text). Link weights are simply the frequency of the association 
between the two words throughout the unit of text, assuming word 
order is preserved. Thus, if two words co-occur three times 
throughout a text, their weight would be three. Link directions are 
defined by natural reading order, where the word on the left is the 
source node, and the substantive word immediately to the right is the 
target node.  
To illustrate how we construct a co-occurrence network, 
Figure 1 shows an example of the corresponding co-occurrence 
network extracted from this famous legal quote: “[T]he dichotomy 
between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Property 
does not have rights. People have rights.”68 All links in Figure 1 are 
weighted with ͳ because the words co-occur only once, with the 
exception of the link between “property and rights” that co-occurs 
twice in the text. The unit of analysis was a single majority opinion, 
and so each co-occurrence network represented the text of a single 
majority Supreme Court opinion. Thus, while the example is only a 
mere three sentences, the same principles are applied when 
extending the method to longer documents.69
                                                     
68. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). 
69. We focused only on majority opinions because they are generally 
known to follow a template that is similar across Justices (e.g., facts of the case, 
followed by the reasoning). Dissents and concurring opinions, however, do not 
follow a consistent format or style. Only examining majority opinions ensures that 
differences in the written structure are more likely attributable to the author’s 
expertise and less to the type of opinion. Another concern is that some might argue 
the clerks do a large part of the opinion writing or at least draft major portions of an 
opinion. While there are some anecdotes, see BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT 
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979), and survey 
evidence, see ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100
YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006), that some 
Justices rely more on their clerks than others, statistical evidence trying to capture 
the linguistic “fingerprints” of clerks is less supportive. See Paul J. Wahlbeck, James 
F. Spriggs II & Lee Sigelman, GhostWriters on the Court?: A Stylistic Analysis of 
U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Drafts, 30 AM. POL. RES. 166, 182-83 (2002); IAN
SULAM, EDITOR IN CHIEF: OPINION AUTHORSHIP AND CLERK INFLUENCE ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 19 (2014), http://icsulam.github.io/pdf/EditorInChief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z6GB-KVXS]. Regardless, it is important to note that at a 
minimum, all Justices read, approve, and have final say over the opinions that they 
author.  
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Figure 1. Example co-occurrence network derived from the text: “[T]he dichotomy 
between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Property does not have 
rights. People have rights.”70 The link weights between the terms are all one, except 
for the weight of 2 between “property” and “rights”, which co-occur twice in the 
text. 
After we constructed a network of ܰ nodes from an opinion, 
we calculated the relevant network measures from its corresponding 
directed and weighted adjacency matrix ܹ. Theܰ ൈ ܰ adjacency 
matrix was obtained by starting with all zero elements and setting 
ܹሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ ൌ ܹሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ ൅ ͳ whenever there was an association of node ݅
to node ݆.
V. TEXT-BASED INDICATORS OF EXPERTISE
The goal is to gather as many text-based indicators of the two 
different factors that previous research suggests are indicative of 
expertise: the amount of knowledge and its structure. To construct a 
measure of expertise, we use text-derived measures of expertise, with 
twelve measures from network science, and five measures from 
information science that, we argue, capture components of expertise 
found in human studies. To that end, we turn to the respective 
literatures to identify the relevant indicators. 
                                                     
70. Lynch, 405 U.S. at 552.  
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A. Network Indicators71
The first eight indicators from network science are standard 
measures that are used to study a variety of natural language 
processing tasks, including document classification,72 text 
summarization,73 authorship identification,74 and quality analysis.75 In 
addition, these measures have been applied to studies ranging from 
cell biology to business.76 These eight network measures are: number 
of nodes, number of links, clustering coefficient, node strength, 
average shortest path length, efficiency, diameter, and radius. We 
discuss each in turn.  
1. Number of Nodes 
The number of nodes, ܰ provides an approximation for the 
number of unique concepts in a network. Recall that chunking allows 
experts to store multiple superficial features into a single deep 
feature.77 In the linguistics domain, Ke found that text quality was 
lower in networks with large ܰ.78 We expect to see similar results in 
our work; namely, that as judicial expertise increases, the number of 
nodes will decrease in the representative co-occurrence networks. 
                                                     
71. In non-trivial cases of computation, we provide a reference for the 
equation used. 
72. See RADA MIHALCEA & DRAGOMIR RADEV, GRAPH-BASED NATURAL 
LANGUAGE PROCESSING AND INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 98 (2011); see also Sabina 
Šišović, Sanda Martinčić-Ipšić & Ana Meštrović, Comparison of the Language 
Networks from Literature and Blogs, in 37TH INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY, ELECTRONICS AND 
MICROELECTRONICS (MIPRO) 1603 (Petar Biljanovic et al. eds., 2014).  
73. See Antiqueira et al., supra note 54, at 584. 
74. See Efstathios Stamatatos, A Survey of Modern Authorship Attribution 
Methods, 60 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 538, 538 (2009). 
75. See Antiqueira et al., supra note 56, at 812; see also Ke et al., supra
note 59, at 308.  
76. See S. Boccaletti et al., Complex Networks: Structure and Dynamics,
424 PHYSICS REP. 175, 260-71 (2006); see also Steven H. Strogatz, Exploring 
Complex Networks, 410 NATURE 268, 268 (2001).  
77. See Chase & Simon, supra note 10, at 56; see also Chi, Feltovich & 
Glasser, supra note 40, at 122. 
78. Ke et al., supra note 59, at 310. 
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2. Number of Links 
The number of links is the number of node-to-node 
associations that exist in the network. Cognitive psychology studies 
suggest that knowledge networks derived from experts maintain only 
the most salient links between concepts, whereas knowledge 
networks derived from novices tend to have more superficial, 
random associations between concepts.79 Similarly, Ke found co-
occurrence networks of high quality text had fewer links than co-
occurrence networks from low quality text.80 Both findings suggest a 
sparseness to co-occurrence networks representing expert 
knowledge, and thus predict that expert co-occurrence networks from 
expertly written text should be leaner compared to their novice 
counterparts.  
3. Clustering Coefficient 
The clustering coefficient quantifies the probability that a given 
node’s neighbors are neighbors themselves.81 Let ݇௜ be the number 
of neighbors of node݅, and ݓ௜௝ be the weight of the link from node ݅










where ݓෝ௜௝ ൌ ݓ௜௝ ݉ܽݔ௜௝ݓ௜௝Τ .
The average clustering coefficient of the network is used in this 








                                                     
79. See Schvaneveldt et al., supra note 47, at 701-02.  
80. See Ke et al., supra note 59, at 311. 
81. Giorgio Fagiolo, Clustering in Complex Directed Networks, PHYSICAL 
REV. E, Aug. 2007, at 1, 2. 
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With respect to text, the clustering coefficient indicates the 
interconnectedness of concepts, which arguably reflects the degree of 
interconnection between concepts in the author’s knowledge 
representation. Linguistic studies show that co-occurrence networks 
derived from poor quality text have high average clustering 
coefficients and those derived from high quality text have low 
average clustering coefficients.82 Experimental studies of expertise 
demonstrate a similar finding, in that experts have fewer, but more 
salient links between concepts where novices have more links, and 
such links connect random concepts.83
4. Node Strength 
A single node has a strength equal to the sum of its weights, 
and the average node strength is the arithmetic mean of all individual 







Node strength is another measure of interconnectedness, and so it is 
not surprising that node strength and clustering coefficient reflects 
the same patterns with respect to expertise. Indeed, Antiqueira and 
Ke found that text quality decreases as average node strength 
increases.84 Šišović used complex network features to discriminate 
between novels and blogs, and showed that average node strength is 
less for novels than for blogs.85 These results become intuitive if we 
assume blogs are samples of novice writing and novels are samples 
of expert writing.  
5. Shortest Path Length
A path is the particular route taken to go between any two 
nodes in a network. For any two nodes in a network, there exists a 
path that requires the minimum number of links needed to travel 
                                                     
82. See Antiqueira et al., supra note 56, at 815-19; see also Ke et al., supra
note 59, at 311.  
83. See Schvaneveldt et al., supra note 47, at 701-02.  
84. See Antiqueira et al., supra note 56, at 815-19; see also Ke et al., supra
note 59, at 311.  
85. See Šišović, Martinčić-Ipšić & Meštrović, supra note 72, at 1608.  
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between the two. This path is known as the shortest path length 
between the two nodes. Let ݀௜௝ give the length of the shortest path 
(minimal length) that connects node i to node j. The average shortest 







In complex network studies of language, the average shortest path 
length has been indicated as measuring the extent to which the author 
is able to establish long sequences of connections among different 
concepts.86 A small average shortest path length is indicative of poor 
writing, in that it reflects an author’s difficulty in making 
associations between semantically distant concepts.87 In contrast, 
experts have more extensive domain knowledge compared to 
novices,88 indicating a larger capability than novices in associating 
semantically distant concepts. Likewise, in the linguistics literature,89
Antiqueira and Margan both found that text quality and 
meaningfulness of text, respectively, were positively correlated with 
the size of the average shortest path length of corresponding co-
occurrence networks.  
6. Efficiency
The average or global efficiency of a network of ܰ nodes is 









Because average shortest path and efficiency are inversely related, 
we expect efficiency to increase as text quality and meaningfulness 
                                                     
86. See Antiqueira et al., supra note 56, at 818. 
87. Id.  
88. See, e.g., Nigel R. Shadbolt & Paul R. Smart, Knowledge Elicitation: 
Methods, Tools and Techniques, in EVALUATION OF HUMAN WORK 163 (John R. 
Wilson & Sarah Sharples eds., 4th ed. 2015).  
89. See Antiqueira et al., supra note 56, at 818; Domagoj Margan, Sanda 
Martinčić-Ipšić & Ana Meštrović, Network Differences Between Normal and 
Shuffled Texts: Case of Croatian, in COMPLEX NETWORKS V 275, 282 (Springer 
International Publishing 2014).  
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decrease. In turn, this implies that experts’ knowledge 
representations will be characterized as less efficient compared to 
novices’ networks because they have larger representations to 
traverse. 
7. Diameter
Given the set of all shortest paths between all connected nodes 
in a network, the diameter is the maximum of this set. Given the 
more extensive knowledge representations of experts compared to 
novices, we expect that the maximum shortest path length to be 
larger for networks representing expert knowledge than for networks 
representing novice knowledge. Margan supports this notion, finding 
a smaller diameter for co-occurrence networks from shuffled (word 
order was randomized) versus unshuffled text.90 In other words, 
when text becomes less meaningful, its representative co-occurrence 
network will correspondingly reduce in diameter.
8. Radius
Where diameter is the maximum of the set of all shortest paths 
between connected nodes of a network, the radius is the minimum of 
this set. We can infer correlations between radius and expertise from 
the findings on average shortest path length and text quality. In 
particular, more expertly written opinions should exhibit a larger 
radius due to experts’ more extensive knowledge. When comparing 
the average network derived from text of an expert to the average 
network from text of a novice, we expect that the novice network is 
less extensive and so has a smaller radius. 
The final four network measures are standard measures that 
have been important for various research applications91 and show 
theoretical promise to being relevant to expertise. These network 
metrics are betweenness centrality, community affiliation, 
modularity index, and node diversity.
                                                     
90. See Margan, Martinčić-Ipšić & Ana Meštrović, supra note 89, at 282. 
91. See generally ALBERT-LÁZLÓ BARABÁSI & JENNIFER FRANGOS, LINKED:
THE NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2014).
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9. Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness centrality measures the extent to which a node 
lies on paths between other nodes.92 For our purposes, we calculate 
the average betweenness centrality over all network nodes. Networks 
derived from expertly written text should have lower average 
betweenness centrality than the networks derived from novice text 
because, in general, their knowledge representations are not as dense 
and connect important concepts directly.93 In this way, they should 
not require “in between” nodes to associate two concepts. However, 
note that linguistic research shows inconclusive results concerning 
text quality and betweenness centrality.94
10. Community Affiliation
A network is said to have community structure if it can be 
easily grouped into sets of nodes such that each set of nodes is 
densely connected internally and sparsely connected externally.95
Following Antiqueira and colleagues,96 we assume that communities 
correspond to the topics conveyed by the text. While studies using 
co-occurrence networks have not shown a conclusive relationship 
between text properties and community affiliation measures, studies 
of text quality show that the coherence or fluidity of the text as 
judged by human raters increases with the domain knowledge of the 
writer.97 Furthermore, expert/novice studies suggest that knowledge 
of experts is more coherent compared to novices.98 That is, experts 
demonstrate more consistency in the associations they make between
concepts stored in memory.99 In this way we expect community 
affiliation to decrease with increasing expertise.
                                                     
92. Ulrik Brandes, A Faster Algorithm for Betweenness Centrality, 25 J.
MATHEMATICAL SOC. 163, 167 (2001).  
93. See Schvaneveldt et al., supra note 47, at 713.  
94. Amancio et al., supra note 54, at 6; see Šišović, Martinčić-Ipšić & 
Meštrović, supra note 72, at 1606-08.
95. E.A. Leicht & M.E.J. Newman, Community Structure in Directed 
Networks, PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS, Mar. 2008, at 1, 1. 
96. See Antiqueira et al., supra note 54, at 584.  
97. See Šišović, Martinčić-Ipšić & Meštrović, supra note 72, at 1603; 
Ronald T. Kellogg, Long-Term Working Memory in Text Production, 29 MEMORY &
COGNITION 43 (2001).  
98. Stout, Salas & Kraiger, supra note 41, at 246.  
99. Timothy Goldsmith & Kurt Kraiger, Structural Knowledge Assessment 
and Training Evaluation, in IMPROVING TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS IN WORK 
Judicial Expertise and Complex Networks 589
11. Modularity Index
Presupposing an optimal community structure of a network, the 
modularity index quantifies the degree to which the network may be 
subdivided into these clearly delineated groups.100 A high modularity 
index means that the network is easily subdivided, and these 
divisions are relatively obvious. Because the modularity index 
depends upon the community affiliation measure, we use the same 
logic in predicting the modularity index’s relation to expertise—
expertly written opinions should be less segmented, making their 
divisiveness low, yielding a low modularity index.
12. Node Diversity
Node diversity is another measurement of community 
distinction, and the average node diversity is simply the arithmetic 
mean over all node diversity values in the network.101 We draw upon 
our arguments from the other community distinction measures (i.e., 
community affiliation and modularity index) to suggest that expert 
knowledge that is highly fluid and coherent will be represented in 
highly fluid and coherent text. This means that co-occurrence 
networks derived from expert writings should have low node 
diversity, while co-occurrence networks derived from novice 
writings will have comparatively higher node diversity.
B. Cognitive Science Indicators 
A large body of research suggests that the amount of 
information is increasing and making the external world more 
complex. Furthermore, experts have greater amounts of knowledge 
and information than novices, so we need to account for this 
disparity in our measure. Thus, we next describe four cognitive 
science indicators taken for this purpose: review internal entropy 
(RI-Ent), average unigram information (AUI), average conditional 
                                                                                                               
ORGANIZATIONS 73-74 (J. Kevin Ford ed., 1997); Stout, Salas & Kraiger, supra note 
41, at 246. 
100. See generally Leicht & Newman, supra note 95, at 11; Jörg Reichardt & 
Stefan Bornholdt, Statistical Mechanics of Community Detection, PHYSICAL REV. E,
July 2006, at 1.
101. Mikail Rubinov & Olaf Sporns, Weight-Conserving Characterization of 
Complex Functional Brain Networks, 56 NEUROIMAGE 2068, 2072 (2011); C.E. 
Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 379
(1948).  
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information (ACI), and conditional information variability (CIV). 
These four indicators were adapted from Vinson and Dale’s work, 
which looked at informational content contained in Yelp user 
reviews.102 Each of the four functions presents a slightly different 
take on the amount of information contained in a unit of text and 
may, in turn, reveal unique insights into expertise. We also include 
the average number of words in an opinion each term for our fifth 
information measure. 
1. Review Internal Entropy (RI-Ent)  
The user “review” studied by Vinson and Dale is analogous to 
a single opinion for our purposes. RI-Ent measures the amount of 
information contained in a single opinion in terms of the novelty of 
the language use within the opinion.103 In other words, if the text is 
highly repetitive (e.g., The cat in the hat. The cat in the hat sat) it will 
have a lower RI-Ent score, but if the text contains more lexical 
richness (e.g., The cat in the hat. A dog came over to play), it will 
have a higher RI-Ent score. The following equation mathematically 
represents this lexical richness: 
ܴܫ െ ܧ݊ݐ௝ ൌ െ෍݌൫ݓ௜ห ௝ܱ൯ ଶ ݌൫ݓ௜ห ௝ܱ൯
ே
௜ୀଵ
Here, RI-Entj yields the information contained within the jth opinion, 
containing N words, as a function of the probability of the ith word 
occurring within that opinion (treated as the conditional probability 
that given opinion j, word i will be present). The RI-Ent score 
quantifies the uniqueness of the language in an opinion because it 
increases as the number of novel words increases. 
2. Average Unigram Information (AUI)  
Like RI-Ent, AUI is a measure of lexical richness of a single 
opinion.104 However, it compares the probability of occurrence of a 
word in an opinion to its probability of occurrence across the entire 
                                                     
102. David W. Vinson & Rick Dale, Valence Weakly Constrains the 
Information Density of Messages, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 36TH ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCI. SOC’Y 1682 (2014).  
103. See id. at 1683-84.  
104. Id. at 1684.
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corpus of text used in this study.105 The information encoded in a 
word can be given as the negative log of the probability of its 
occurrence (the less probable a word, the more informative), for any 
given opinion j, the following equation defines its average unigram 
information by averaging over the probability of occurrence of the ith





In this way, AUI gives a direct measure of the relative informational 
content of an opinion across all opinions and may vary depending on 
the expertise of the Justice.  
3. Average Conditional Information (ACI)  
ACI measures how informative a word is given its local 
context.106 In other words, it measures how likely it is that a given 
word appears in text, considering the previous word in text.107 In this 
way, ACI acts as a measure of the uniqueness of bigrams in text, 
where uniqueness is measured relative to the distribution of bigram 
(two-word) frequencies in the corpus. Mathematically, the 
conditional information in opinion j is the average negative log of the 
probability of a word’s occurrence given the previous word, as 
defined in the following equation: 
  ܣܥܫ௝ ൌ െ
ଵ
ேିଵ
σ ଶ ݌ሺݓ௜ȁݓ௜ିଵሻே௜ୀଵ    
4. Conditional Information Variability (CIV)  
Unlike RI-Ent, AUI, and ACI, which indicate the average 
amount of information in an opinion, CIV quantifies the degree to 
which the language of an opinion varies in its informational content 
by calculating the variability in the ACI measure.108 It is expressed as 
the standard deviation of the set of conditional information scores for 
each word of the jth opinion: 
ܥܫ ௝ܸ ൌ ߪሺܥܫ௝ሻ
                                                     
105. Id.  
106. Id.  
107. See id. 
108. See id. at 1683-85.  
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5. Average Number of Words 
In addition to RIE-Ent, AUI, ACI, and CIV, we look to Posner 
who says experts should be able to “say more with less” and take as 
our fifth cognitive indicator (and seventeenth and final indicator of 
expertise), the average number of words per opinion each term.109
Using these seventeen indicators, because these measures are 
continuous (and not categorical), we employ factor analysis to detect 
underlying latent factors of expertise. 
VI. METHODS
To best study judicial expertise and its dynamic nature, we 
chose to study Supreme Court Justices because of the importance of 
the Supreme Court as an institution in American government. 
Furthermore, because the Supreme Court only has nine Justices at 
any given time and because the memberships of the nine Justices do 
not overlap uniformly, for our study we chose to examine any Justice 
who has been on the Supreme Court for a minimum of ten terms. 
Because a study of all issue areas is not feasible, we chose to focus 
our attention on the majority opinions from two issue domains 
identified by the Supreme Court Database: criminal procedure and 
economic activity.110 Those two issue domains comprise a very large 
number of cases and provide the best assurances that each Justice 
typically wrote at least one opinion in that area each term. Ideally, 
we would like to have a Justice write several opinions on each issue 
area each term, but the practicalities of nonrandom case selection at 
the Supreme Court coupled with the rules and workload concerns 
regarding opinion writing assignments limit the number of opinions 
written by each Justice within each issue area.111
                                                     
109. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 297-301. 
110. See Analysis Specifications, THE SUP. CT. DATABASE,
http://supremecourtdatabase.org/analysis.php (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/X22Z-AARK]. Criminal procedure involves issues such as: habeas 
corpus, search and seizure, Miranda warnings, right to counsel, cruel and unusual 
punishment, and other related issues (includes all issues in the Database that receive 
a code from 10000 to 10600). Economic activity issues include: antitrust, mergers, 
bankruptcy, liability, securities regulation, patents and copyrights, and other related 
issues (includes all issues in the Database that receive a code from 80000 to 80350). 
111. For example, the Chief Justice and most senior Associate Justices tend 
to assign the bulk of who writes the majority opinion. While there can be some 
strategy involved in opinion assignment, workload considerations also play a 
significant role. 
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We then construct networks from the written opinions 
following our method outlined above and then use that data to create 
measures of expertise for each term a Justice is on the Court. So if a 
Justice wrote three majority opinions in one term on criminal 
procedure, the expertise indicators would be an average taken from 
those three opinions. 
After we have the indicators, the next step performs factor 
analysis on the seventeen indicators from the criminal procedure area 
to identify the two factors that characterize expertise.112 Table 1 
contains the results of the two-factor solution for the criminal 
procedure domain (eigenvalues were 8.55 and 2.32, respectively), 
with an orthogonal rotation.113 A commonly accepted rule-of-thumb 
is that any factor that loads at greater than .3 suggests that an 
indicator loads onto that factor. With this in mind, the first two 
columns of loadings in Table 1 show that both factors are well 
defined in the sense that each factor has at least four indicators 
loading on each factor separately, though some indicators do load 
onto both factors. While this may not be ideal, it is not concerning 
because each factor has enough individual items to be sufficiently 
defined. Furthermore, the uniqueness values in the far right column 
are all generally low, with the possible exception of radius, 
modularity index, ACI, and CIV, though their uniqueness values are 
not concerning because each of their loadings are at least .34 or 
greater. 
                                                     
112. We performed iterated principal axis factoring, keeping all factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1. This is known as Kaiser’s criterion and is a widely 
accepted rule-of-thumb for selecting the appropriate number of factors. Henry F. 
Kaiser, The Application of Electronic Computers to Factor Analysis, 20 EDUC. &
PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 141, 146 (1960). 
113. The orthogonal rotation assumes that the two factors are not correlated 
with each other. Substantively this means that the amount of knowledge is unrelated 
to how a person stores or structures their knowledge. We think this is a reasonable 
assumption under the idea that it is possible to have large amounts of knowledge but 
stored poorly or idiosyncratically. However, alternative analyses that allow for the 
two factors to be correlated return very similar results. On a related yet separate 
issue, the next highest eigenvalue was .694, which suggests a two-factor solution 
was the correct solution. Finally, to ensure that comparing Justices from different 
time periods did not produce a confounding effect, we also divided the data at the 
mid-point to construct two datasets, one for pre-1981 and one for post-1981. Factor 
analysis on these two time periods each revealed a two-factor solution with factor 
scores that correlate very highly with scores from the full time period. 
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Table 1 
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF 17 INDICATORS OF EXPERTISE
Amount of 
Knowledge Structure Uniqueness
Clustering Coefficient .162 -.639 .566
Node Strength .603 -.735 .097
Betweenness Centrality -.792 .357 .245
Node Diversity -.011 -.647 .582
Community Affiliation .766 -.125 .398
Modularity Index -.372 .297 .773
Average Shortest Path -.472 .838 .076
Efficiency .400 -.877 .071
Number of Links .886 -.347 .094
Radius .113 .405 .823
Diameter -.099 .660 .555
Number of Nodes .957 -.233 .031
Number of Words .853 -.387 .124
RI-Ent .917 -.086 .151
AUI -.518 .797 .098
ACI -.126 .529 .705
CIV .363 .348 .747
Note: Table contains the rotated factor loadings after varimax rotation. 
The first factor appears to be capturing what we label the 
“amount of knowledge” factor because the RI-Ent measure loads on 
it as well as the number of nodes, number of links, and number of 
words (recall RI-Ent captures novel information or distinct word 
usage within an opinion itself). This seems intuitive in that as 
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opinions become longer, these indicators would capture that feature. 
Moreover, because all of those indicators load positively onto the 
factor, this suggests that high values for the amount of knowledge 
actually correspond to low expertise (i.e., for RI-Ent, more novel 
information is less expert-like in that it emphasizes a focus on new or 
novel information, not established knowledge, which is what experts 
in the past were shown to focus on). 
We label the second factor as “structure” because many of the 
indicators that tap into interconnectedness of concepts load highly on 
it. Specifically, these include the clustering coefficient, node 
diversity, and average shortest path length (and its derivatives—
diameter, radius, and efficiency). ACI also loads highly on this 
structure factor, and it is believed to indicate the novelty of a 
linguistic phrase (two nodes connected by a link), which may reflect 
how often an opinion repeats the same connected ideas.114
Next, we use the factor analysis to estimate factor scores to 
represent the two latent constructs of expertise. This gives us a 
variable that represents the amount of knowledge in a domain and a 
variable that represents the structure of knowledge in a domain. For 
ease of interpretation, we multiplied the “amount” variable by -1 to 
ensure a more intuitive interpretation (e.g., high values would 
indicate more expertise).115 Figures 2 and 3 contain a dot that is an 
estimate for the degree of each Justice’s expertise in each year for 
cases in the criminal procedure issue area. The line is a lowess 
smoother designed to fit a weighted moving average, which should 
help in trying to identify any trends. Figure 2 contains the amount of 
knowledge factor, and Figure 3 contains what we argue represents 
the degree of expertise in how knowledge is structured.  
                                                     
114. The same factor analysis was performed on majority opinions from the 
economic issue area. The results are very similar, revealing a two-factor solution 
with almost all indicators loading onto the same factors. Only three of the indicators 
differed in their loadings: The clustering coefficient did not load highly on either 
factor, and the AUI and ACI indicators switched factors. Some minor deviations are 
to be expected given it is a different issue area and also due to the tendency for 
textual data to be noisy. Importantly, on the whole, the factor analyses revealed the 
same result. 
115. Recall, this was done based on how the indicator variables loaded onto 
each factor in Table 1. In other words, the loadings for the “amount” factor variable 
initially suggested that “low values” indicate expertise. Thus, we reverse coded it to 
make it more intuitive to interpret. 
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Figure 2. Amount of Knowledge Expertise Over Time, by Justice. Each dot 
represents the estimated level of expertise in a given year for that Justice. The line is
a lowess smoother. 
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Figure 3. Structure of Knowledge Expertise Over Time, by Justice. Each dot 
represents the estimated level of expertise in a given year for that Justice. The line is 
a lowess smoother. 
The figures reveal several important and somewhat surprising 
findings. First, expertise for some Justices increases over time, for 
some it does not change, but for others it decreases. Specifically, 
with respect to Figure 2, which displays the factor of expertise 
representing the amount of knowledge, Justices Black, Breyer,  
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Burton, O’Connor, Powell, Reed, and Souter all display some 
increased level of expertise during their tenure on the Court. In 
contrast, Justices Alito, Brennan, Clark, Douglas, Frankfurter, 
Ginsburg, Jackson, Kennedy, Stevens, Stewart, Thomas, and perhaps 
Warren show a decreased level of expertise. Still other Justices show 
no real trend in either direction: Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Scalia. 
Only a few Justices display a large amount of noise, such as Roberts, 
Harlan, and possibly Warren.116
We see similar trends in Figure 3 for the structure of expertise. 
Justices Alito, Douglas, Harlan, Jackson, Kennedy, Reed, and Souter 
display signs of increasing expertise over time in the form of a more 
expert-like structure. In contrast, Black, Frankfurter, O’Connor, 
Thomas, Warren, and White show decreasing expertise. What is 
interesting, when looking at Figures 2 and 3 in conjunction with each 
other, we see that for some Justices whose decrease in expertise in 
one area was compensated for an increase in the other type (e.g., 
Alito, Douglas, Kennedy). This suggests that some Justices may 
cope with the growing complexity by developing and relying on one 
type of expertise more than (and maybe at the expense of) another 
type.  
Perhaps the most important finding from Figures 2 and 3 is the 
fact that some Justices increased their expertise while others 
decreased their expertise. This is noteworthy because it confirms our 
earlier suspicions that expertise can decline, even as one gains more 
experience. 
In the next section, we use our estimates of expertise to see if 
Justices with more expertise can reduce the number of concurring 
opinions. 
VII. ARE EXPERTS ABLE TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF CONCURRING 
OPINIONS? 
To assess the validity of our two measures of expertise, we 
assess whether increased expertise correlates with the number of 
concurring opinions written in that case. Importantly, the Supreme 
Court is a rule-making body whose goal is to clarify the law for the 
lower courts and its other audiences. Thus, the Court plays a key role 
in crafting legal policy. Generally speaking, a “good” majority 
                                                     
116. If a Justice does not have at least ten dots on their respective figure, it 
means that they did not author a criminal procedure majority opinion during that 
term (e.g., Roberts only has eight dots).  
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opinion will communicate its intent and meaning in a clear signal 
without ambiguity. However, one possible way this clarity can be 
muddied is through other Justices writing concurring opinions. This 
includes the possibility of either a regular concurrence or a special 
concurrence. A regular concurrence is when a Justice agrees with the 
rationale and disposition of a case and simply wants to say 
something in addition to the majority opinion.117 A special 
concurrence is when a Justice agrees with the disposition but not the 
rationale.118 Both types of concurring opinion have the capability to 
muddy the waters with respect to how the Court is perceived and 
whether the Court speaks with a singular voice. Thus, a majority 
opinion author wants to reduce the number of concurring opinions.119
It is in this context that the expertise of a Justice plays a key role in 
shaping legal policy in America.  
Importantly, Justices with more expertise should be able to 
limit the number of concurring opinions because Justices have the 
ability to craft and frame the opinions in an expert-like manner so as 
to better address counterarguments and explain the majority’s 
rationale.120 Also, because the Justices wait to see the first draft of the 
majority opinion before they formally decide if they will join the 
opinion, it enables us to test whether Justices with more expertise 
can limit or reduce the number of concurring opinions being 
written.121  
To measure our dependent variable—the number of concurring 
opinions being written—we use data from the Supreme Court 
Database and simply count the number of concurring opinions 
written in each case. We also differentiate between regular 
concurrences and special concurrences. Thus, we have two 
dependent variables: the number of regular concurrences and the 
number of special concurrences. Each variable ranges from 0 to 4, 
and each is heavily skewed, with the modal outcome of both types of 
concurrence being “0.”122 Because our dependent variables are count 
variables that are over-dispersed (i.e., the standard deviation is larger 
                                                     
117. Paul M. Collins, Jr., Amici Curiae and Dissensus on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 143, 153 (2008).  
118. Id.  
119. MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 26, at 68-69. 
120. See BLACK, JOHNSON & WEDEKING, supra note 27, at 54. 
121. MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 26, at 66-67.  
122. For regular concurrences, the distribution of observations is: (0) 1,138; 
(1) 321; (2) 72; (3) 7; and (4) 3. For special concurrences, the distribution of 
observations is: (0) 1,111; (1) 337; (2) 71; (3) 18; (4) 4.  
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than the mean), we use maximum likelihood to fit a negative 
binomial regression model.123
The two measures of expertise—amount of knowledge and 
structure of knowledge—are our main variables of interest. For 
expertise, high values indicate more expertise. To ensure that we are 
accounting for other possible explanations of the number of 
concurring opinions, we include several more covariates. We include 
a measure if a precedent was altered, with the expectation that the 
rule of law is predicated upon upholding past precedents. Thus, 
Justices do not regularly stray from established precedent and to do 
so would be unpopular and thus might compel some Justices to write 
a concurring opinion to add their own personal explanation.124 We 
also control for whether the petitioner won the case because the 
Supreme Court is prone to reverse cases at a much higher rate.  
We also include a categorical variable for whether the Court 
declares a federal, state, or local law as unconstitutional or not. 
Because it is categorical, we make “no declaration” the omitted 
baseline condition. We also include a variable to control for the cases 
that have a lower court dissent. We do this because lower court 
dissents can signal clear differences in a case and expose fault-lines, 
making the likelihood of writing a concurrence greater. We also 
control for whether there was an unusual disposition in the case on 
the basis that Justices are less likely to “silently” join a majority 
opinion without writing a concurring opinion if that majority 
disposition does something out of the ordinary. Finally, we include 
fixed effects for each Justice and also each term. These fixed effects 
allow us to be confident that any idiosyncratic or stylistic effects in 
the opinions, or any differences due to a particular term or natural 
court that do not represent expertise will be captured by those 
coefficients. The fixed effects ensure that our expertise estimates will 
be indicative of expertise in general and not just a handful of 
Justices.
Table 2 contains the model estimates for both criminal 
procedure and economic activity for both regular and special 
concurrences. The results largely support our expectations with some 
important exceptions. Specifically, looking first at the left hand side 
of Table 2—the two models for regular concurrences—we see that 
                                                     
123. We also estimated the models as poisson regressions for count 
dependent variables and with ordinary least squares regression, and both strategies 
return very similar results.  
124. Collins, supra note 117, at 156. 
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the “amount” variable is statistically significant and signed 
negatively for both criminal procedure and economic activity. This 
indicates that as relative expertise increases, the number of regular 
concurring opinions decreases. For the “structure” variable, it is 
significant and negatively signed for criminal procedure, but it is not 
significant for economic activity.  
We are not sure why expertise in structuring knowledge would 
matter less in the economic activity domain, but perhaps it is 
possible that the two legal areas of the law are sufficiently different, 
with economic activity not requiring a complex structure to store the 
domain knowledge. This seems plausible given that the issue domain 
of criminal procedure is much younger, starting to rapidly increase in 
size in the 1940s and 1950s after the famous footnote four in United 
States v. Carolene Products, Co.,125 and the issue area has been a 
near-constant source of contention in American politics ever since 
then.126 In contrast, the body of law governing economics has been 
around for much longer, undergoing relatively less change compared 
to criminal procedure. However, this is just speculation. 
                                                     
125. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
126. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 69, at 203. 
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Table 2 
DOES EXPERTISE EXPLAIN THE NUMBER OF CONCURRING OPINIONS? 





















































































Justice Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Term Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of 
Observations 1452 1425 1452 1425
Note: *=p<.05, **=p<.01, one tailed test. Cell entries for each model represent 
negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The dependent variable in all models is the number of concurrences written, ranging 
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from 0 to 4. Both models contain fixed effects controlling for each individual Justice 
and each term/year, but are not shown due to space constraints. The three variables 
for declaring a law unconstitutional are categorical relative to an omitted baseline of 
no law declared unconstitutional.  
Shifting to the right side of Table 2, focusing on special 
concurrences, we see that only the amount variable for criminal 
procedure cases is significant. What this means is that judicial 
expertise appears to have relatively little effect on reducing the 
number of special concurrences written. This may be intuitive in 
some sense given that if a Justice disagrees with the rationale of the 
majority opinion, that disagreement may have roots in the Justices’ 
ideology or belief about how the law should be, and so no amount of 
expertise in the form of framing or addressing of counter-arguments 
will satisfy the concurring Justice.  
To help understand the substantive meaning of the coefficients, 
we used the model output from the criminal procedure cases for 
regular concurrences to generate expected counts. Holding other 
variables at their mean, we varied the amount of knowledge variable 
from two standard deviations below the mean to two standard 
deviations above the mean, and we are able to use the model to 
predict the number of expected regular concurrences. We find that at 
two standard deviations below the mean, the expected count of 
regular concurrences is .35. At one standard deviation below the 
mean, the expected count is .24; at the mean the expected count is 
.17; at one standard deviation above the mean it is .12; and at two 
standard deviations above the mean it is .08. These changes may 
seem small at first glance, especially since we would not even expect 
a concurring opinion with the least expert Justice writing the 
majority opinion. However, the shifts in these values are actually 
quite large considering the fact that by far the modal outcome is 0 
concurring opinions. 
Thus, to better understand where expertise can have an 
important impact, consider a case where all other values are at their 
mean (like the example above), but the Supreme Court is altering a 
precedent and issuing an unusual disposition (two factors shown to 
increase the likelihood of the number of regular concurrences in 
Table 2). When we perform the same sort of simulation where we 
vary only the amount of expertise, we see the expected counts 
change from: 1.35 (-2 s.d.), .94 (-1 s.d.), .66 (mean), .46 (+1 s.d.), to 
.32 (+2 s.d.). Thus, in a case where the other conditions would highly 
predict a concurring opinion being written if a novice were writing 
the majority opinion, a highly skilled expert writing the majority 
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opinion would likely be able to prevent that concurrence from being 
written. 
To ensure that our results are not just limited to one dependent 
variable, we also applied our expertise measures to see whether they 
predicted the size of the majority coalition. Without going into great 
detail, it should be sufficient to know that both the amount and 
structure of expertise significantly predicted the size of the coalition 
for criminal procedure cases, and the amount variable was significant 
for the economic activity issue area. Thus, our results are robust 
across other outcome measures of importance.  
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In summary, we highlighted how expertise is dynamic and that 
it is crucial to conceptualize it this way when the legal environment 
is rapidly becoming more complex. We then highlighted how 
previous attempts to measure judicial expertise quantitatively, which 
occurred primarily in the political science literature, all attempted to 
equate experience with expertise—something that is problematic in a 
dynamic domain. Next, we outlined approaches to measuring 
expertise in psychology as well as network science. We showed that 
we can use text written by experts to construct networks with 
properties that have shown in prior research to indicate expertise. We 
then examined the underlying structure of these indicators to reveal 
two facets to expertise that were consistent with prior research.  
Our findings should spark great interest in how Supreme Court 
opinions are written. We found that not all Justices developed 
expertise as they gained more experience. In fact, some Justices
increased their expertise, but others either stayed the same or 
declined. This finding meshed with our expectation, given that the 
legal domain is becoming increasingly complex. We think it is 
fascinating and noteworthy that even in the face of this growing 
complexity, some Justices were able to become greater experts in 
areas of the law. Unfortunately, there are also other normative 
consequences that our findings suggest. In particular, the finding that 
some Justices’ expertise declined over time (for whatever reason) 
suggests that legal policy may have suffered. While we do not know 
the causes of why expertise increases or decreases, and that was not 
the purpose of this paper, our findings suggest that expertise is not a 
simple concept, but rather a multifaceted one that may be changing 
as the environment changes. Furthermore, this can be complicated by 
the fact that Justices choose to adopt a legal philosophy or style of 
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jurisprudence to try and become more principled or consistent in 
their decision making. What we should keep in mind, however, and 
perhaps most importantly, is that our measures of expertise 
significantly predicted the number of concurring opinions written in 
an expected way. Thus, we can be confident that judicial expertise 
plays an important role in crafting legal policy and how a case 
decision influences its relevant audiences. 
In this paper we have focused on how to measure judicial 
expertise and only one of its implications. However, it is important to 
understand that developing a new measure of expertise is vital 
because it becomes possible to answer so many other important 
research questions. For example, in future work we might investigate 
whether experts are better able to ensure compliance with their 
decisions by whether lower court judges are more likely to treat 
expertly written opinions favorably. Being able to address these sorts 
of questions, we would then be able to speak more forcefully about 
important substantive implications about how expertise influences 
legal policy. As we saw above, this can come in the form of an extra 
concurring opinion being written that may constrain or limit the 
influence of a majority opinion. This lack of clarity might then lead 
to more litigation and conflict in the lower courts, something that 
Justices generally want to avoid. In sum, understanding that judicial 
expertise is dynamic is crucial to having a judiciary that is not only 
independent but also able to pull its own weight in a separation of 
powers system. 
Finally, this research extends the use of complex networks on 
texts into the legal academy. The legal field is not immune to 
changes that are already happening in other areas of society, where 
extracting information from text has already become increasingly 
important. With our approach here, we were able to use common 
topological properties of co-occurrence networks and extract 
information relevant to expertise. Importantly, however, this could 
be easily extended to other network measures that may be correlated 
with expertise. One possibility is the “small world” property of 
networks,127 where the degree of “small worldness” is thought to 
reflect ease of mental navigation.128 Furthermore, one could also 
                                                     
127. Duncan J. Watts & Steven H. Strogatz, Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-
World’ Networks, 393 NATURE 440 (1998).  
128. Ramon Ferrer i Cancho & Richard V. Solé, The Small World of Human 
Language, 268 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 2261 (2001); Michael S. Vitevitch, 
What Can Graph Theory Tell Us About Word Learning and Lexical Retrieval?, 51 J.
SPEECH, LANGUAGE & HEARING RES. 408, 414 (2008).  
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incorporate semantic relationships between text concepts as a way to 
supplement the reliance on topological properties and tap into the 
rich semantic meaning of the texts. Regardless, we believe our 
approach to measuring judicial expertise is robust, and it should open 
the door for future legal researchers who want to model human 
knowledge of the law with text. 
